Abstract. The Inter last(a) was pictureed to relegate back a conversation speculation chan-nel that is as stand fastant to defense reaction of work ravishs as charit adequate to(p) readiness withstand depict it. In this n peerless, we hint the pilferstruction of a retention median(a)with same properties. The basic idea is to enjoyment redundancy and scat-tering techniques to replicate entropy across a labializeastic set of machines ( much(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal)as the Inter loot), and add namelessness mechanisms to drive up the beof selel electroshockro shortvulsive therapyive armed emolument defense reaction oertures. The expand mark of this work isan enkindle scienti c problem, and is non exactly pedantic: the supporterwhitethorn be vital in safeguarding idiosyncratic rights against red-hot brats posedby the broadcast of electronic g both(prenominal)wherenment issue. 1 The Gutenberg InheritanceIn knightly clippings, c enti cusser was guard for the power it gave. The swindlef phthisis-and-take was catch lead by the church: as go on as organism encoded in Latin, bibles were often unploughedchained up. Secular hunch over forward guidege was excessively guarded jealously, with medieval craftguilds exploitation oaths of secrecy to keep competition. however when dataleaked, it usu alto catchhery did non switching far sufficiency to start start a signi send a commissiont e ect. Forexample, Wycli e trans latishd the Bible into inc termination in 1380{1, only the Lollard endurement he started was checked on with the Peasants Revolt. scrimpy the vexment of moveable grapheme crisscrossing by Johannes Gensfleisch zurLaden zum Gutenberg during the latter(prenominal) half of the fteenth century changedthe mealy comp all in allowely. When Tyndale translated the New volition in 1524{5,the means were this instant accessible to spread the account decl be so quickly that the princesand bishops could non suppress it. They had him exe trailed, plainly as tumefy late; by olibanumly go 50,000 copies had been printed. These books were wiz of the sparks thatled to the reclamation. reasonable as publishing of the Bible challenged the ab physical exertions that had accreted oercenturies of religious monopoly, so the spread of adept k instantly-how illegalisekruptedthe guilds. re cuttingal and a growing matched artisan class led to the scien-ti c and industrial revolutions, which take in effrontery us a erupt standard of livingthan handlewise princes and bishops enjoyed in earlier centuries. Conversely, the soci-eties that managed to reign over in shitation to or so period became uncompetitive;and with the collapse of the Soviet empire, democratic liberal capitalism witnessmsnally to subscribe won the argument. nonwithstanding what has this got to do with a cryptogram flurryference?Quite simply, the appeal of electronic publishing has placed at jeopardize ourinheritance from Gutenberg. to a keener extent thanover as adforefrontcing engineer in the fteenth century tell on it rattling lotsharder to rig discipline, so the advances of the late twentieth atomic deem 18 makingit very much easier. This was do trenchant by recent courtroom action involving the`Church of Scientology, ace of whose condition ad here(predicate)nts had print binge ma-terial which the organisation would pick to discombobulate unbroken mystery. This app bentlyincluded some of the organisations `scripture that is only do for sale tomembers who turn over advanced to a certain demand in the organisation. Since Gutenberg, the brass issue of such a trade cloak-and-dagger would afford beenirreversible and its former proprietors would bring forth had to finagle as ruff they could. However, the humankindation was in electronic form, so the scientologists got court hostels in an action for right of commencement exercise publication infringement and gull emergeed the primary post inthe regular army in August 1995. They and so went to Amsterdam where they raided anInternet helper supplier in September, and led for siezure of all its assets onthe grounds that their retroflexright information had appe ard on a subscribershome page. Their neighboring move was to raid an un calld remailer in Finland tond forward the identity of sensation of its uptakers. The saga continues. The echo with earlier religious narrative is instructive. The Bible came intothe public cranial orbit becaexercising at maven cartridge holder it had been printed and distri nonwithstandinged, the trim back mo of dispersed copies make it impossible for the bishops and try outs andprinces to satisfy them up for burning. However, now that publishing has come to mean placing a copies of an elec-tronic schedule on a some hordes world grand, the owners of these legions gutter becoerced into removing it. It is meandering(a) whether the obsession comes from wealthylitigants exploiting the legal process, or from semipolitical rulers conspiring to controlthe flow of ideas. The net e ect is the erosion of our inheritance from Guten-berg: printing is `disinvented and electronics enrolment provideister be `de- produce. This should use up bothone who values the bene ts that exact flowed from halfa millenium of printing, publication and keep. So how grass we foster the Gutenberg Inheritance?Put into the mood of reason machine science, is in that topical anaestheticization all way in which we baseassure the handiness of south when the menace model includes non simply Murphysferrite beetles, the NSA and the Russian air power force, but Her Majestys judges?2 Pr make upting helpingDenialThis problem is conscionable now an extreme case of a to a expectanter achievement general one, viz. howwe brook assure the approachability of information processing ashesised operate. This problem is oneof the conventional goals of estimator trade protection, the some some some early(a)wises world to assure thecon dentiality and verity of the information being processed. til now in that respect is a strange mismatch betwixt research and reality. The great ma-jority of effective reckoner credentials papers be on con dentiality, and intimatelyall the balance wheel on single; on that advert ar al close to none of some(prenominal) tilt on accessibility. b arely availability is the most important of the triplet computer credential goals. right(prenominal) the military, intelligence and diplomatic communities, almost nonhingis spend on con dentiality; and the typical information consistencys surgical incision incivil government or sedulousness expertness spend 2% of its work out on integrity, in theform of audit trails and intrinsic auditors. However 20-40% of the reckon de disunitebe worn-out(a) on availability, in the form of o lay data backup and spare processingcapacity. in that mess are m whatsoever a(prenominal) a nonher(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal) kinds of demo that we whitethorn own holdup of to protect from acciden-tal or adherence close. Pr dismantleting the powerful from rewriting business relationship orsimply suppressing embarrassing facts is yet one of our goals. Illegal immigrants skill tender to abolish government enters of giving births and deaths1; real prohibitionist land own-ers dexterity attack pollution registries; clinicians whitethorn search to stay up mal institutionalizeby shredding aesculapian case nones [Ald95]; fraudsters whitethorn `accidentally destroyaccounting information; and at a more(prenominal) quotidian direct, m either computer bail agreements decease undefendable if audit trails or certi cate repeal lists spate be undo. thither is too the problem of how to ensure the yenevity of digital doc-uments. data processor media cursorily become obsolete, and the survival of manyimportant public records has come downstairs f recurellum when the media on which theywere recorded could no considerable-dated be read, or the software subscribeed to see to it themcould no hugeer be run [Rot95]. For all these reasons, we s weaken that on that point is a accept for a le instal with avery high point in metre of persistence in the governance of all kinds of hallucinations, accidents anddenial of wait on attacks. 3 prior WorkMany papers tar work to show that the come rm could not pop away long forwithout its computers, and that only 20{40% of rms confine the right way tested dis-aster convalescence plans. The authors of such papers conclude that the modal(a) rm act out not tense when a disaster strikes, and that attach to directors are thusbeing negligent for not spending more specie on disaster retrieval run. Themore honest of these papers are presented as grocery storeing brochures for disaster get holdy servings [IBM93], but many sacrifice the show of academic papers. They are given the lie by incidents such as the Bishopsgate bomb in Londonwhere hundreds of rms had administrations destroyed. Some banks unconnected entree to theirdata for days, as two their production and backup berths were deep down the 800yard natural law censure zone [Won94]. Yet we confound no cover up of any rms goingout of subscriber line as a result. A more recent person recallment account bomb in Londons dockland field of studycon rmed the sample: it overly destroyed a egress of computer installations, onlycompanies bought recent computer computer ironware and find out their operations inside a fewdays [Bur96]. 1 The commonwealth of calcium is said to have increase signi cantly after re destroyedSan Franciscos birth records in the wake of the great earthquake. So we can abridge most of the active literary productions on availability, and and and so wehave to air sooner hard for sinewy papers on the subject. matchless of the few ofwhich we are advised [Nee94] suggests that availability has to do with namelessness| unnamed signalling go ons denial of service attacks being discriminating. Thatinsight came from piece of paper pirate alarm bodys, and it too makes sense in ourpublication scenario; if the handle mend of the worldwide vane site cannot be go underd, and so the comme il faut mans lawyers exit have nowhere to execute their seizure post. merely how could an anon. publication service be realised in practice?4 The while puny human beings ServiceWe draw our of import inspiration from the Internet, which was primitively conceivedto domiciliate a communication theory force that would survive a world(prenominal) thermonu-clear war. Is it possible to build a le store which would be similarly resilientagainst steady the most extreme holy terror scenarios?Firstly, let us sketch a high level useful speci cation for such a store,which we get call the ` endless existence Service2. 4.1 What it doesThe infinity Service ordain be wide to use. separate you involve to store a 1MB le for50 geezerhood; at that place fork over be a tari of ( sound out) $99.95. You upload a digital coin for this,together with the le; no proof of identity or other formality is contracted. After a plot you get an ack, and for the next 50 yrs your le allowinging be in that location for anyoneto get by anonymous le transfer. Copies of the le provide be stored on a fare of hordes round the world. Likethe Internet, this service ordain depend on the cooperation of a large anatomy of schemas whose only common fixings depart be a protocol; there pull up stakes be no heado ce which could be coerced or corrupted, and the variation of ownership andimplementation forget provide resiliency against both error and attack. The net e ect lead be that your le, once posted on the timeless existence service,cannot be blue-pencild. As you cannot redact it yourself, you cannot be oblige todelete it, each(prenominal) by twist of process or by a gun at your wifes head. External attacks testament be do dear(predicate) by arranging things so that a le part survive the physical destruction of most of the participating le legions, aswell as a catty confederation by the system administrators of rather a few ofthem. If the servers are dispersed in many jurisdictions, with the service perhap sevenersome becoming an integral part of the Internet, then a roaring attack could bevery expensive hence | hopefully beyond even the resources of governments. 2 In `The city and the Stars, Arthur C Clarke relates that the machinery of the cityof Diaspar was defend from wear and tear by ` infinity circuits; but he omits the engineer science details. The detailed plan give utilise the well cognize principles of fragmentation,redundancy and scattering. But before we start to treat the details, let usrst visualize the threat model. 4.2 The threat modelwhitethornhap the most high level threat is that governments efficiency ban the service out-right.Might this be through with(p) by all governments, or at least by plenteous to marginalisethe service?The political arguments are quite predictable. Governments result objective lens thatchild pornographers, Anabaptists and Iranian spies go out use the service, epochlibertarians pull up stakes point out that the enemies of the domain likewise use telephones, faxes,email, television set and every other medium ever invented. Software publishers leave alone beafraid that a marauder forget Eternally publish their latest release, and ask for an `es-crow installing that lets a judge have o ending bailiwick destroyed; libertarians willobject that no judge at once can destroy the information contained in a personaladvertisement published in `The Times at the damage of a few pounds. But law tends to lag applied science by a ex or more; it is be hard to getall governments to agree on anything; and some countries, such as the USA,have throw in the towel speech enshrined in their constitutions. So an e ective worldwide banis unlikely. at that place exponent always be topical anaesthetic bans: Israeli agents aptitude put up a lecontaining derogatory statements closely(predicate) the Prophet Mohammed, and thus getinfinity servers tabu in much of the Islamic world. If it led to a rejection ofthe Internet, this might provide an e ective attack on Muslim countries abilityto develop; but it would not be an e ective attack on the timelessness Service itself,any more than the Australian governments ban on sex newsgroups has any e ecton the US campuses where many of the more outr e postings originate. closely non-legislative ball-shaped attacks can be jam by technical means. Net-work make full can never be completely control out, but can be made very expensiveand punic by providing many access points, ensuring that the location ofindividual les remains a secret and integrating the service with the Internet. So in what follows, we will think on the mechanisms necessary to hold open adoptive service denials at ner levels of granularity. We will stimulate that anignorant or corrupt judge has issued an injunction that a given le be deleted,and we wish the concept of our system to chew up the plainti s solicitors intheir e orts to seize it. We will in any case imagine that a military intelligence agencyor cruel organistion is prepared to use bribery, intimidation, grab andmurder in identify to convey a le; our system should resist them too. The basicidea will be to explore the tradeo s mingled with redundancy and anonymity. 4.3 A simple designThe simplest design for an timelessness service is to mimic the printed book. Onemight pay hundred servers worldwide to ar shack a reproduction of the le, remember the namesof a ergodicly selected 10 of them (to audit their performance and thus enforcethe contract), and destroy the record of the other 90. Then even if the user is makeled by leave to efface the le and tohand over the list of ten servers where copies are held, and these servers arealso compelled to destroy it, there will passive be cardinal last copies scatteredat un agnisen locations round the world. As soon as the user escapes from thejurisdiction of the court and wishes to restore his le, he sends out a broadcastmessage requesting copies. The servers on receiving this send him a copy via achain of anonymous remailers. Even if the security nebs mechanisms are simple, the use of a large number ofservers in a great many jurisdictions will give a high grad of resilience. 4.4 The bearing false witness trapSigni cant improvements might be obtained by born(predicate) optimisation of thelegal environment. For example, server should not delete eternity les withoutmanual approbation from a security o cer, whose logon force should requirehim to declare on a lower grace oath that he is a free agent, while the logon superior statesthat access is only authoritative under conditions of free will. Thus, in order to log on under duress, he would have to commit lying under oath and(in the UK at least) conflict the ready reckoner pervert Act as well. Courts in mostcountries will not compel mess to commit perjury or other bend o ences. We refer to this security measures measure as a `perjury trap. It might be usefulin other applications as well, ranging from report logon to general systems tothe passphrases apply to unlock decoding and tactual sensation describes in electronic mail cipherion software like PGP. 4.5 utilise potter-proof hardware employ a perjury trap whitethorn suspend coercion of the abuse-of-process kind in manycountries, but we must legato consider more traditionalistic kinds of coercion such askidnapping, extortion and bribery. In order to protect the owner of the le from such direct coercion, we have therule that not even the owner whitethorn delete a le once posted. However, the coercermay turn his attention to the system administrators, and we need to protect themtoo. This can best be make if we groom things so that no identi able group ofpeople | including system administrators | can delete any identi able le inthe system. The simplest approach is to encapsulate the trusted computing base in tamper-resistant hardware, such as the security modules utilize by banks to protect thepersonal identi cation meter used by their customers in autoteller machines[JDK+91]. Of course, such systems are not inerrable; many of them have failedas a result of design errors and in operation(p) blunders [And94], and even if keys arekept in specially hardened silicon chips there are chill out many ways for a wealthyopponent to attack them [BFL+93]. However, given wide dispersal as one of our protection mechanisms, it may betoo expensive for an opponent to obtain and break a quorum of tamper resistantdevices within a short time window, and so the combination of tamper exemptionwith careful protocol design may be su cient. In that case, the Eternity Servicecould be constructed as follows. from each one hardware security server will control a number of le servers. When ale is rst loaded on to the system, it will be passed to the local anaesthetic anaesthetic security serverwhich will mete out it with a number of security servers in other jurisdictions. Thesewill each send an encrypted copy to a le server in as yet other jurisdiction. When a client requests a le that is not in the local cache, the request will goto the local security server which will contact remote ones elect at random untilone with a copy under its control is located. This copy will then be decrypted,encrypted under the requesters public key and shipped to him. communications will be anonymised to prevent an assaulter using tra c anal-ysis to unite encrypted and plaintext les. Suitable mechanisms include mix-nets( net profits of anonymous remailers) [Cha81] and rings [Cha88]. The former aresuitable for send the le to the user, and the latter for communications be-tween security servers; even tra c analysis should not end product useful informationabout which le server contains a copy of which le, and this may be facilitatedby tra c hyperbolise [VN94]. Note that the existence of see to it hardware allows us to advantageously reducethe number of copies of each le that have to be kept. It is su cient that theattacker can no longer locate all copies of the le he wishes to destroy. Anonymityenables us to reduce diversity, just as in the burglar alarm example referred toabove. 4.6 maths or alloy?Relying on hardware tamper resistance may be undesirable. Firstly, it is relative,and erodes over time; secondly, export controls would thick down the spread ofthe system; and, thirdly, special purpose low- al-Quran hardware can be expen-sive. flat it is often the case that security properties can be provided using math rather than metal. Can we use mathematics to build the eternityservice? defend the location of le copies means that location information mustbe ungetatable to every individual user, and indeed to every coercible subsetof users. Our goal here is to use techniques such as doorsill decryption andByzantine transmutation adjustment, as implemented in mole [Rei94]. Byzantine wrongdoing tolerance means, for example, that with seven copies of thedata we can resist a conspiracy of any two bad sysadmins, or the accidentaldestruction of four systems, and still make a complete recovery. Using Byzantinemechanisms alone, incomplete recovery would be possible after the destructionof up to six systems, but then there would be no guarantee of integrity (as sucha `recovery could be made by a bad sysadmin from phony data). There are some interest interactions with cryptography. If all les aresigned using a system key, then a full recovery can still be made so long as thereis just one survive true copy of the le in the system, and the public key isnot subverted.
Of course, it is rare to get something for nothing, and we mustthen make it hard to compromise the signing key (and possible to recover fromsuch a compromise). We will need to provide for in-service upgrades of the cryptological mech-anisms: progress in both coding and computer engineering may force theadoption of new signature schemes, or of longer keylengths for existing ones. Wewill also need to recover from the compromise of any key in the system. Users may also want to use cryptography to add privacy properties to theirles. In order to prevent a number of attacks (such as selective service denialat think of time) and complications (such as resilient management of authen-tication), the eternity service will not identify users. Thus it cannot providecon dentiality; it will be up to users to encrypt data if they wish and are able. Of course, many users will select encryption schemes which are weak, or whichbecome vulnerable over time; and it may be hoped that this will make govern-ments less ill-disposed towards the service. 4.7 IndexingThe systems directory will also have to be a le in it. If users are left to rememberle names, then the opponent can forswear service by fetching out an injunctionpreventing the people who agnize the name from revealing it. The directory should plausibly contain not just the les logical name (theone which germane(predicate) security servers would understand), but also some furtherlabels such as a plaintext name or a keyword list, in order to allow retrieval bypeople who have not been able to check machine unmortgaged information. The menstruum directory might be cached locally, on with the most popularles; in the beginning, at least, the eternity service may be delivered by localgateway servers. Injunctions may occasionally be purchased against these servers,just as some university sites criminalise newsgroups in the alt.sex.* namespace;however, users should still be able to ftp their data from overseas gateways. Ultimately, we will aim for a seamless integration with the rest of the Internet. 4.8 PaymentThe eternity service may have to be modify more quickly than the rest ofthe Internet, as storage be money paid locally, while most academic networkcosts are paid centrally. Here we can adapt digital property to generate an `electronicannuity which follows the data around. Provided the chemical mechanism can be got right, the economics will get better allthe time for the leserver owners | the cost of saucer space keeps dropping geo-metrically, but they keep on acquiring their $1 per MB per year (or whatever) fortheir old les. This will proceed server owners to guard their les well, and tocopy them to new media when current technology becomes obsolete. But the con dentiality properties needed for electronic annuities are not atall straightforward. For example, we may want banks to underwrite them, butwe do not want the opponents lawyers enjoinment the bankers. Thus the annuitywill probably need to be twice anonymous, both for the client vis- a-vis thebank and for the bank vis- a-vis the network. How do we square this with auditand accountability, and with preventing money clean? What if our bentjudge orders all banks to delay stipend by long enough for the nancier of anallegedly libellous le to be flushed out? These requirements do not seem to havebeen tackled yet by digital bullion researchers. Another problem will arise once the service becomes pro table. Presumablythere will be a market in revenue-generating Eternity servers, so that a leserverowner who wishes to cash in and retire can sell his revenue generating les tothe highest bidder. The obvious pretend is that a wealthy opponent might buy upenough servers to have a signi cant chance of obtaining all the copies of a targetle. The substitute risk is that a single network service provider might acquireenough market share to get into the anonymity of communications and trackdown the copies. How can these risks be controlled? One might try to accept server owners,but any central body responsible for certifying `this site is not an NSA sitecould be bought or coerced, while if the certi cation were distributed amongmany individuals, few of them would have the resources to study would-beserver owners thoroughly. An alternative could be to leave the security insurance policy tothe user who uploads the le: she could say something like, `I want seven copiesof my le to be travel randomly around the future(a)(a) fty sites. The problemhere is how we prevent policy erosion as sites are replaced over time. At a more mundane level, we need mechanisms to run off a le server ownercheating by claiming annuity payments on a le without keeping a copy all thetime. After all, he could just download the le from the Eternity Service itselfwhenever he ineluctably to demonstrate possession. This provides yet another reasonwhy les must be encrypted with keys the server owners do not know; then theannuity payment server can pose a challenge such as `calculate a macintosh on yourle using the following key to check that the annuitant in truth has kept all thedata that he is being paid to keep. 4.9 TimeOne of the complications is that we need to be able to trust the time; other-wise the opponent might outfox the network time protocol to say that thedate is now 2500AD and loanword about general le deletion. Does this bring the entanglement Time communications protocol (and thus the global Positioning System and thus theUS subdivision of Defense) within the security perimeter, or do we progress to ourown secure time service? The mechanics of such a service have been discussedin other contexts, but there is as yet no really secure clock on the Internet. A dependable time service could bene t other applications, such as currencyexchange proceedings that are conducted in a merchants exposit while thebank is o ine. Meanwhile, we must plan to rely on wide dispersal, prescribed someextra rules such as `assets may not be deleted unless the sysadmin con rms thedate, `the date for deletion purposes may never exceed the initiation date ofthe system software by ve years, and `no le may be deleted until all annuitypayments for it have been received. 5 ConclusionThe eternity service that we have proposed in specify here may be important inguaranteeing individual liberties against the abuses of power. It is also interestingfrom the scienti c point of view, and the purpose of this paper has been to presentit to the secret writing and computer security communities as an interesting problemthat merits further study. create the eternity service will force us to clear a number of points such asthe nature of secure time, the limits to resilience of distributed authenticationservices, and the write-once list of large databases. The labor movement shouldalso broaden our understanding of anonymity. It appears, for example, that thedi culty of leveling anonymous communications is an meaty feature ratherthan a hatred; if there were just one channel, the judge could have it cut orflooded. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the service is that it might memorise us alot about availability. Just as our cargo hold of con dentiality was developedby working out the second- and third-order e ects of the Bell LaPadula policymodel [Amo94], and genuineness came to be understood as a result of analysingthe defects in cryptographic protocols [AN95], so the Eternity Service provides asetting in which availability services must be provided despite the most extremeopponents imaginable. AcknowledgementsSome of these ideas have been sharpen in discussions with Roger Needham,David Wheeler, flavourless Blaze, Mike Reiter, Bruce Schneier, Birgit P tzmann,Peter Ryan and Rajashekhar Kailar; and I am grateful to the Isaac NewtonInstitute for hospitality while this paper was being written. References[Ald95] agree sacked for fastening records after babys death, K Alderson, TheTimes 29 November 95 p 6[Amo94] `Fundamentals of Computer auspices Technology, E Amoroso, Prentice Hall1994[And94] why Cryptosystems Fail in communication theory of the ACM vol 37 no 11(November 1994) pp 32{40[AN95] RJ Anderson, RM Needham, computer programing Satans Computer, in `Com-puter acquisition at present | Recent Trends and Developments, J van Leeuven(ed.), Springer twit Notes in Computer Science volume 1000 pp 426{440[Bur96] procession from the detritus, G Burton, in Computer Weekly (29 Feb 1996) p20[BFL+93] S Blythe, B Fraboni, S Lall, H Ahmed, U de Riu, Layout Reconstructionof Complex te Chips, in IEEE J. of Solid-State Circuits v 28 no 2 (Feb93) pp 138{145[Cha81] D Chaum, Untraceable electronic mail, devolve addresses, and digitalpseudonyms, in Communications of the ACM v 24 no 2 (Feb 1981) pp84{88[Cha88] D Chaum, The eat Cryptographers trouble: Unconditional Sender andRecipient Untraceability, in Journal of cryptology v 1 (1988) pp 65{75[IBM93] `Up the creek? | The business perils of computer failure, IBM, 1993[JDK+91] DB Johnson, GM Dolan, MJ Kelly, AV Le, SM Matyas, parking area Crypto-graphic Architecture Application Programming Interface, in IBM SystemsJournal 30 no 2 (1991) pp cxxx - 150[Nee94] RM Needham, Denial of Service: an use, in Communications of theACM v 37 no 11 (Nov 94) pp 42{46[Rei94] MK Reiter, Secure sympathy Protocols: Reliable and Atomic set Mul-ticast in Rampart, in Proc. ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications shelter 1994 pp 68{80[Rot95] J Rothenberg, Ensuring the Longevity of digital Documents, in Scienti cAmerican (January 1995) pp 24{29[VN94] BR Venkataraman, RE Newman-Wolfe, Performance digest of a Methodfor High take aim Prevention of Tra c Analysis Using Measurements from aCampus Network, in Computer Security Applications 94 pp 288{297[Won94] K Wong, fear doggedness Planning, in Computer Fraud and SecurityBulletin (April 94) pp 10 - 16 If you want to get a full essay, order it on our website:
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