Introduction
Brunnermeier (2009) records two trends that emerged leading up to the fluidity squeeze. He notes firstly that instead of holding loans on the banks equilibrize sheets, they repackaged them and passed them on to other investors and thereby offloading risk. Secondly he mentions that banks were finance their assets holdings with shorter maturity instruments which left them vulnerable to a dry up in liquidity funding.
Based on readings from Brunnermeier (2009) and Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2008), I ordain begin by discussing how the Basel committee rules created incentives for banks to voxicipate in merged securitization and led to the undermining of internal risk modelling which reduced character reference quality.
Drawing heavily from Gorton (2009), I will discuss the study role of asymmetric information and how a systemic horrify causes informationally insensitive debt to become informationally sensitive which results in them becoming illiquid and financial institutions to become susceptible to bank runs.
I will likewise look at how the use of credit paygrade agencies allowed banks to part from their due diligence which subsequently led to rating ostentatiousness, by rating agencies as they collect fees from maintaining a bring home the bacon of loans for securitization. Drawing on Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2008) I will discuss how rating agencies are under scrutiny due to their un-willingness and failure to rate investments.
Securitization
The Basel 1 rule required that banks hold capital of at least 8% of loans on their balance sheets. Drawing on Brunnermeier (2009) we see how the Basel committee rules created strong incentives for banks to take part in structure securitization. The mechanism of moving loans off their balance sheets to the structured investment vehicles (SIVs) allows for additional loans to be...If you want to get a replete essay, order it on our website: Ordercustompaper.com
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